Proposal for Voluntary Disclosure in China

Noam Noked, Yan Xu


How should taxpayers who have not complied with their Chinese tax obligations voluntarily correct their tax affairs? Many countries have adopted tax amnesties and voluntary disclosure procedures for that purpose. Unlike those countries, China does not have nationwide voluntary disclosure procedures. However, the Chinese tax authorities frequently reduce or waive penalties for taxpayers who voluntarily disclose their noncompliance and settle their unpaid taxes. This article calls for the adoption of nationwide voluntary disclosure procedures in China and explores the design considerations of such procedures. As China is modernizing its tax laws and strengthening its tax enforcement, this proposal is worth serious consideration.

Keywords: China, Tax Amnesty, Tax Enforcement, Voluntary Disclosure.

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